Berry v. McFarland Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 37951 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
11-10-2011
Berry v. McFarland Respondent's Brief Dckt. 37951
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Berry v. McFarland Respondent's Brief Dckt. 37951" (2011). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3025.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3025
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
KARLETTA GRACE BERRY, a widow, 
KARLETTA GRACE BERRY, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Jerry 
Lee Roy Berry, CAPTAIN'S WHEEL 
RESORT, INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, 
V. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Supreme Court Docket No. 
37951-2010 
Kootenai County District 
Court No. CV 2007-2409 
) 
MICHAEL B. MCFARLAND, MICHAEL ) 
B. MCFARLAND, P.A., and KAREN ) 
ZIMMERMAN, ) 
Defendants/Respondents. 
) 
) 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the 
First Judicial District of the State ofidaho 
In and for the County of Kootenai 
Honorable Charles W. Hosack, District Judge, Presiding 
Rex A. Finney 
Attorney at Law 
120 East Lake St., Suite 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS 
Attorney for Appellants 
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Michael B. McFarland 
Attorney at Law 
421 Coeur d'Alene Avenue, Ste. lL 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS - PRO SE 
Attorney for Respondents 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(a.) Nature of the Case 
This is a case brought by Karletta Beny [Beny], a widow, alleging that Respondent Michael 
B. McFarland [McFarland] was her late husband's attorney, that he and his fiancee, Karen 
Zimmernian [Zimmennan] purchased assets from her deceased husband for less than fair market 
value, and that such purchase was a breach of fiduciary duty. The complaint sought rescission of the 
Purchase and Sale Agreement, compensatory damages, constructive trust, quiet title, disgorgement 
of profits and to set aside "all actions taken by McFarland and Zimmerman as corporate officers, 
directors and shareholders." 
(b.) Course of Proceedings 
McFarland and Zimmerman agree with the first paragraph ofBeny' s description. The jury, 
on the special verdict form, found that there was a "breach of duty regarding the Sttock [sic] 
Purchase Agreement by defendant Michael McFarland as the attorney for the plaintiff which was the 
proximate cause of damages to the plaintiff' and that there was a breach of fiduciary duty regarding 
the Stock Purchase Agreement owed by defendants to plaintiffs, "even though there was no attorney-
client relationship between them, which was the proximate cause of damages to plaintiffs." 
McFarland and Zimmerman agree with the remainder of Berry's description of the course 
of proceedings. 
(c.) Statement of Facts 
McFarland and Zimmerman disagree with Beny's Statement of Facts as follows: 
On page3 ofBeny's Brief, it states "Jeny and Karletta Benypurchased the Nordstroms' 200 
shares of stock in the Captain's Wheel Resort, Inc in June, 2000." As shown by Plaintiff's Exhibit 
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6, Jerry Berry alone purchased that stock. Karletta Berry was not added as a shareholder until 
October, 2006, after the Purchase and Sale Agreement between Jerry Ben-y and McFarland and 
Zimmennan had been signed. As the District Court stated, "Karlotta [sic] Berry was not an owner 
and is not a signator to the Stock Purchase Agreement." (R.P. 1245) 
On pages 7 and 26, Berry alleges that McFarland and Zimmennan "did review financial 
statements" before putting up the $100,000. The cited portion of the transcript (Tr. P. 804, L. 1-20) 
clearly states that they were not reviewed. 
On page 10, Berry states that a special meeting was held on October 15, 2011. The meeting 
was in 2006. 
On page 13, Berry states that "McFarland let Monnie Cripe and Marie Streater basically run 
the business without any normal controls such as checking till to be long or sho1i, meal costing or 
other nonnal protocol." There was no testimony or evidence establishing "normal controls" or 
"normal protocol". This is argument, not a statement of facts. 
Likewise, on page 14, Berry's statement that "the grounds for cause were questionable at 
best" is opinion or argument, not a statement of fact. 
On page 16, the testimony of Toby McLauglin (which was disputed by the respondents) is 
stated as though it is fact. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Respondents have no additional issues on appeal. 
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ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Respondents are not seeking attorney fees on appeal. 
RESPO~DENTS' ARGUMENT 
1. Standard of Review 
McFarland and Zimmennan do not disagree with Berry's citations of authority regarding the 
standard of review. 
2. The District Court Acted within the boundaries ofits discretion, and acted consistently with 
legal standards. 
Berry's brief, on page 19, argues that "No citation to authority should be required for a court 
to understand that the law provides when an attorney buys his client's property for less than the fair 
value, the attorney is liable to the client for the difference between the fair value and the amount 
paid." The transparency is self-evident. There is no such authority. As the District Judge stated in 
his Memorandum Opinion and Order, "The difficulty with this case lies in the disconnect between 
the final judgment and any articulable legal theory supporting the result." (R.P. 1240) 
It should be noted that Berry's Complaint, which asserted numerous claims (including 
rescission of the Purchase and Sale Agreement), did not contain a request for such relief. This theory 
apparently developed during the trial. 
The District Court acted within the boundaries of its discretion when it found a portion of 
the Restatement of Trusts to be "inapplicable to the facts of this case." (R.P. 1241). The District 
Court explained its reasoning adequately, stating, "the relationship here is not that of an investment 
banker managing trust property for the beneficiaries of a trust. Instead, there is an anns length bona 
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fide purchase and sale agreement between competent paiiies." "During trial, plaintiffs' counsel 
conceded that the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement was valid." (R.P. 1241) 
3. The District Court reached its decision by the exercise of reason. 
One major problem was the inadequacy of the Special Verdict form submitted to the jury. As the 
District Comi stated, "The form of the jwy verdict submitted to the jury did not provide the jury with 
the option of restoring the 2003 loan agreement which the jury had found to be the true agreement 
of the parties. The jury entered a monetmy award because the form of the special verdict gave the 
jury no other option. The Court is firmly convinced that the verdict would have been different, had 
the jury been aware of the full range of remedies available." [ emphasis added] (R.P. 1246) 
This appears to be a primary basis for the order for a new trial, and was reached by the 
exercise ofreason. Berry's original complaint asked for the remedy ofrescission, as opposed to the 
award of damages. Since there had been no election of remedies at the time the case was submitted 
to the jury, and Berry's case focused on the argument that the original transaction was a loan, the jury 
should have had the opportunity to make a finding in that regard. 
The District Comi, further, in addressing the insufficiency of evidence supp01iing the 
damages award, stated, "There was no evidence of value as to 50% of the stock in the closely held 
corporation as of the July 2006 date." (R.P. 1245) It is certainly reasonable to assert that a 50% 
(non-controlling) ownership interest in a small, closely-held corporation would be valued differently 
from 100% ownership, or even controlling, majority ownership. 
The Comi added, "In 2003, an arms length transaction [the Campbell sale] had established 
the purchase price of 50% of the stock at $100,000. There was absolutely no evidence of any market 
for 50% of the stock of the corporation at the price of $480,500 as of any date, much less as of July 
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2006. A mathematical computation of dividing the appraised value of the real property, less business 
debts, by 2 is purely speculative as to what 50% of the stock in a closely held corporation would be 
worth on the open market." (R.P. 1245, 1246) This accurately reflects the evidence, and the exercise 
of reason by the District Court. 
In her brief (page 25), Berry argues that "the very formula the jury used to derive the damage 
figure was provided by the testimony of Michael B. McFarland", quoted on pages 25 and 26. As in 
all other testimony, however, that addressed only the total value - not that of a partial, non-
controlling interest. Further, neither Berry nor anyone outside the jury knows the"veryformula" that 
was used. Even if the assumption is c01rect, however, it is still speculative. 
The District Court's finding of insufficient evidence to support finding of breach of fiduciary 
duty was likewise the result of the exercise of reason, clearly explained: "Assuming a breach of 
fiduciary duty can be the proximate cause of wrongfully causing a 100% owner of the stock in a 
corporation to enter into a contract of sale for 50% of the stock, there still needs to be a showing of 
an appropriation by the wrongdoer of a business opportunityreasonably available to the 100% owner 
to sell one half of his ownership interest to a third party at some materially different p1ice." (R.P. 
1246) 
CONCLUSION 
The Order if the District Court vacating the judgment and ordering a new trial should be 
affirmed, and the Respondents should be awarded costs on appeal.. 
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of November, 2011 
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Michael B. McFarland 
Attorney for Respondents 
Certificate of Delive1y 
The undersigned hereby certifies that two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Respondents' 
Brief were served by deposit in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on the 8th day of November, 2011 
addressed to the following: 
Rex A. Finney 
Attorney at Law 
120 Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
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